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How can I tell you. How can I convince you, brother; sister that your life is in danger. That every day 
you wake up alive, relatively happy, and a functioning human being, you are committing a rebellious 
act. You as an alive and functioning queer are a revolutionary. There is nothing on this planet that 
validates, protects or encourages your existence.  
-The Queer Nation Manifesto  
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LIST OF ACRONYMS AND TERMINOLOGY 
 
LIST OF ACRONYMS  
CEDAW = Convention on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women /Committee on the 
Elimination of Discrimination Against Women  
CESCR = Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 
CPED = Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearances  
CRC = Committee on the Rights of the Child 
CRPD = Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities 
ECOSOC = Economic and Social Council 
ICCPR = International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
ICESCR = International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 
IHRL = International Human Rights Law 
LGBT = Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual and Transgender/Transsexual persons 
LGBTI+ = Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Transgender/Transsexual, Intersex, Queer and Asexual 
LBT = Lesbian, Bisexual and/or Transgender women 
SOGI = Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity 
SOGIESC= Sexual Orientation, Gender Identity and Expression and Sexual Characteristics 
SR = Special Rapporteur 
UDHR = Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
UN = United Nations 
WHO = World Health Organization 
TERMINOLOGY 
Cisgender/cis: someone whose gender identity/expression is aligned with the sex they were 
assigned at birth.  
Transgender/trans: someone who has a gender identity/expression that differs from the sex they 
were assigned at birth. 
Transsexuals: someone who has modified or transitioned from one sex to the other through medical 
methods. 
The acronym LGBTI+ will be preferred when referring to individuals who identify or are perceived as 
such.   
The term ‘people/persons who experience sexual orientation and gender identity/expression in 
diverse and non-normative ways’ will be preferred when referring to persons who deviate from the 
heteronorm, not only those who identify as LGBTI+. 
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HETERONORMATIVITY IN INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW 
INTRODUCTION 
 
The promise of universality in which international human rights law (IHRL) was founded is certainly 
one that has yet to be fulfilled. The most recent developments of IHRL have proven that this is 
particularly true in the case of women and other individuals whose sexual orientation and/or gender 
identity/expression and/or sexual characteristics fall outside of the narrow and socially constructed 
conceptions of ‘normality’, or better put, of the heteronorm. 
 
Universality has been said to be the cornerstone of human rights.1 This principle was drawn from the 
idea that said rights apply to everyone simply because everyone is human2 and as such, everyone is 
equal in terms of rights because being or not being human is an ‘inalterable fact of nature.’3 It is also 
believed that the universal quality of human rights does not necessarily entail universal enforcement, 
and that this is the explanation of why even though everyone is entitled to these rights, enjoying them 
is a matter that is left almost entirely to the discretion of sovereign states.4  
 
However, and as I will argue in the rest of this document, the invention of human rights articulated in 
itself a strict classification of what it means to be human, one that was first based on the experiences 
of cisgender men and later -thanks to the hard work of many feminists in the international arena-  
evolved to consider, not even fully include, those of cisgender women, resulting in turn into an 
extremely binary classification that limits who gets to be perceived as a human under international 
human rights law. Thus, undermining its very own predicate of universality and turning invisible the 
human rights violations suffered by LGBTI+ persons and others who do not necessarily fit into any fix 
categories of ‘gender identity’.  
                                            
1 Ilias Bantekas and Lutz Oette, International Human Rights Law and Practice (Cambridge University Press, 
2013) 37 
2 Jack Donnelly, International Human Rights (Dilemmas in World Policies, 1993) 19 
3 Jack Donnelly, ‘The Relative Universality of Human Rights’ (2007) 29 Human Rights Quarterly 281 
4 ibid. 283 
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Drawing mostly on feminist and queer theories and the current status of IHRL at the United Nations 
(UN) level, this paper will provide a review of literature that will help to frame the discussion on how 
the universality of international human rights is based on normative notions of sexuality and gender 
that are, and have been, predominantly heterosexual. Moving forward from the literature review, this 
research will present an overview of the current scenario of LGBTI+ rights in the international sphere, 
providing an insight of what has been achieved in the last years in terms of sexual orientation, gender 
identity/expression and sexual characteristics (SOGIESC) rights and analyzing the outcomes of such 
advancements. Subsequently, an examination on how IHRL has failed people who experience sexual 
orientation. gender identity/expression and sexual characteristics in diverse and non-normative ways 
will be provided. The following and final section before concluding will evaluate the feasibility behind 
the development of an international instrument addressing the violence and discrimination that 
LGBTI+ persons, and others who refuse to adopt labels and take part on the binary system of gender 
identity, suffer, taking as a comparative example the case of the Convention on the Elimination of All 
Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW).   
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LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
‘One is not born, but rather becomes, woman’,5 said once the French feminist writer, philosopher and 
activist, Simone de Beauvoir in her acclaimed book, the Second Sex. With this formulation, Beauvoir 
conceived gender -in this case ‘woman’- as some sort of quality that could be progressively achieved. 
Such constructivist approach to the category of gender contrasted the marked tendency of the era to 
think of gender as something that was almost exclusively determined by biological factors.  
 
Beauvoir’s conception of gender acknowledges the existence of an underlying expectancy to become 
gendered; one that, according to her, is clearly dictated by others and perpetuated through some 
cultural compulsion.6 Nonetheless, her understanding of gender also recognizes a pre-gender agent; 
one that, whether passively or actively, has the ability to appropriate or adopt gender.7 
 
This formulation, however, does not per se specify if the narrative of construction gives place to any 
type of choice. In other words, it does not respond to the question of whether or not the agent could 
potentially adopt a different gender, or no gender at all.8 
 
It is not surprising that by the time Beauvoir wrote the Second Sex, such possibilities were not yet 
fully contemplated. In spite of that, her questioning of gender as something innate and biologically 
determined helped pave the way for the development of more comprehensive approaches to the 
category of gender. These dualistic normative notions of sexuality and gender that recognize it as 
socially constructed but that do not challenge its binarism and its predominantly heterosexual 
conceptualization were, nevertheless, the ones that became an integral part of most of the modern 
fights for the expansion of rights, and so they became institutionalized and codified in many contexts 
that regulate life,9 one of which, I will argue in this paper, is the international set of human rights. 
                                            
5 Simone de Beauvoir, The Second Sex (Vintage books, 1949) 330 
6 Judith Butler, Gender Trouble (Routledge, 1990) 8 
7 ibid 
8 ibid 
9 Mary Evans and Carolyn H. Williams, Gender: The Key Concepts (Routledge, 2013) 13 
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The incorporation of gender, in the form of the recognition of equality for women, in the human rights 
languages did not arrive without a struggle.10 The word ‘gender’ is barely mentioned in the provisions 
of the core international human rights instruments, and is not once mentioned in the provisions of 
CEDAW. Instead, the archaic and equivocal use of ‘sex’ as a way of differencing between men and 
women in the social context was preferred. This is of course a reflection of the reality of the time in 
which the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) was adopted. However it seems as if this 
heritage from the early developments of IHRL has not been sufficiently contested in the drafting of 
more recent covenants, given that only the International Convention for the Protection of All Persons 
from Enforced Disappearance (CPED) and the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities 
(CRPD) make any direct references to the notion of gender in their provisions, and only the latter 
distinguishes this category from the biological differences between males and females by actually 
addressing issues of a gender nature.  
 
This insufficient development to capture the essence of the differences experienced by cismen and 
ciswomen, and to make ciswomen part of the IHRL system, installed in turn a biological determinism 
which only reinforced the heteronormativity that so strongly influences international law. Biological 
determinism has historically been used to assert that certain groups (ethnic groups and sexual 
minorities among others), are intellectually, morally and socially inferior to others (e.g. cismen).11 This 
androcentric view argues that there is a direct and causal relationship between some biological 
properties of human beings and their behaviors.12 From this perspective, the social differences 
between human groups were interpreted as a natural reflection of innate and immutable genetic 
traits.13 Such formulation has been used by groups in power to maintain a discourse that normalizes 
                                            
10 Johannes Morsink, ‘Women’s Rights in the Universal Declaration’ (1991) 13:2 Human Rights Quarterly  230 
11 Lee Ann Martinez, ‘Biological determinism’ (Salem Press Encyclopedia of Health, 2019) available at: 
<http://0-search.ebscohost.com.serlib0.essex.ac.uk/login.aspx?direct=true&db=ers&AN=94416381&site=eds-
live> Accessed August 5, 2019. 
12 ibid 
13 ibid 
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the multiple inequalities that exist, and that validates the order established by the male dominancy. 14 
It is through said dominancy that the pervasiveness of heteronormativity finds its legitimacy. 
 
In her book, Gender Trouble, Judith Butler coined the term ‘heterosexual matrix’15 to what was later 
denominated as heteronormativity. For Butler, this matrix designated the ‘grid of cultural intelligibility 
through which bodies, genders, and desires are naturalized within the hegemonic context of 
heterosexuality.’ 16 Heteronormativity, on the other hand, has been defined as a regulatory practice 
of sex/gender/desire that alters or sometimes sets the conditions of possibility and impossibility for 
gender intelligibility’.17 Such possibilities have been based on the assumption that biological sex, 
sexual orientation and gender/gender identity, are always aligned.  
 
More recent understandings of heteronormativity have described this concept as the ‘assumption that 
heterosexuality is the default, preferred, ‘normal’ state for human beings because of the belief that 
people fall into one or other category of a strict gender binary’.18 This definition is for the most part 
accurate. However, it fails to give an account of how entrenched heteronormativity is within the 
different social and political processes of human life, how related it is with the patriarchal system of 
beliefs19 and how violent it is for people with diverse sexual orientations, gender identities/expressions 
and/or for people whose sexual characteristics do not fit the stereotypical notions of male or female 
bodies.  
 
As mentioned before, the early inclusion of a gender approach -based on a biological determinist 
perspective rather than in the actual constructivist understanding of gender- in the IHRL system, 
                                            
14 ibid 
15 Butler (n 6) 6 
16 ibid p.151 
17 Samuel E. Chambers, ‘An Incalculable Effect: Subversions of Heteronormativity’ (2007) 55 Political Studies 
656, 679 
18 John Harris and Vicky White, A Dictionary of Social Work and Social Care (Oxford University Press, 2018) 
335 
19 Giddens takes patriarchy to be a reference to male dominancy. The patriarchal system of belief is therefore 
a reflection of how embedded patriarchy is in most conditions of life, including ideologies and forms of social 
control. See Anthony Giddens, Sociology (2nd edition, Polity Press, 1993) 173 
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reinstalled the heterosexual matrix in a new form.20 This may have been what was necessary at the 
moment for women’s rights to be recognized within a system created almost entirely by men. But 
such fight for the expansion of rights, grounded in the aspiration to have the same rights as cismen 
within the patriarchal order, resulted in the perpetuation of women’s secondary status and the 
legitimization of men’s power and authority21 -by setting the experiences of these latter as the 
universal standard that should be followed to have rights-.22 In addition to this, other identities and 
experiences such as the ones from persons who experience sexual orientation and gender 
identity/expression in diverse and non-normative ways were turned invisible.  
 
Gender as a social construction has, however, been included in other instruments of soft law and in 
several campaigns of the UN. The gender mainstreaming strategy for the promotion of gender 
equality was endorsed by the 189 countries who attended the Fourth World Conference on Women 
in Beijing in 1994.23 The UN as well as other international organization were invested with the 
responsibility to implement said strategy in their work supporting the efforts of Member States.24 In 
1997, the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC), through its agreed conclusions, provided  some 
guidelines on how the Organization should work to incorporate gender perspectives when carrying 
out its work.25 The mainstreaming of gender was defined as the ‘process of assessing the implications 
for women and men of any planned action, including legislation, policies or programs, in all areas and 
at all levels’.26 
 
                                            
20 Dianne Otto, ‘Queering Gender [identity] in International Law’ (2015) 33:4 Nordic Journal of Human Rights 
299 - 318 
21 Dianne Otto, ‘International Human Rights Law: Towards Rethinking Sex/Gender Dualism’ in Margaret Dvies 
and Vanessa E. Munro (Eds), The Ashgate Research Companion to Feminist Legal Theory (Routledge, 2013) 
197 
22 ibid 
23 United Nations, ‘Gender mainstreaming - a strategy for promoting gender equality: with particular focus on 
HIV/AIDs and racism’ (UN, 2001) available at: 
<https://www.un.org/womenwatch/osagi/pdf/gmstrategyhivaids.PDF> accessed August 16, 2019  
24 ibid 
25 ibid 
26 UN Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC), ‘UN Economic and Social Council Resolution 1997/2: Agreed 
Conclusions’ (1997), UN Doc E/CN.9/1997/7 
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In an effort to combat gender-based discrimination and aiming to achieve gender equality, the UN 
adopted a constructivist definition of gender in the framework of this strategy. This definition 
recognized that the differences and inequalities experienced by women all over the world have to do 
with the gender roles commonly assigned to them. In this regard the Expert group meeting on the 
development of guidelines for the integration of gender perspectives into human rights activities and 
programs stressed that: 
 
‘The term "gender" refers to the ways in which roles, attitudes, values and relationships 
regarding women and men are constructed by all societies all over the world. Therefore, while 
the sex of a person is determined by nature, the gender of that person is socially 
constructed.’27 
 
This way of approaching gender as a social category is in line with most of the feminist standard 
definitions of gender. Nevertheless, it is very evident that this definition still anchors gender to a 
dualistic biological base (male/female),28 and it is far from moving on from the binary 
conceptualization of gender (women/men). As a result of this, subjectivities that challenge the 
normative conceptions of gender are excluded, and some of them are placed in a different category, 
usually denominated as gender identity.  
 
Gender identity has been understood almost as a contraposition to the category of gender, but for 
the most part it has been framed in a way that does not completely challenge the common 
interpretation of the gender binary (woman/man). Instead, this ‘new’ category of gender has been 
treated as something that only applies to transgender people (and sometimes to intersex people.)  29 
This tendency of using gender identity in a binary way and as a feature that only exclusively defines 
                                            
27 Commission on Human Rights, ‘Report of the Expert Group Meeting on the Development of Guidelines for 
the Integration of Gender Perspectives into United Nations Human Rights Activities and Programmes’, (1995) 
UN Doc E/CN.4/1996/105 6 para. 13 
28 Otto (n 20) 313 
29 ibid 300 
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trans binary identities (transwoman/transman) should be resisted -while still recognizing the specific 
challenges and human rights abuses suffered by those who are, or are perceived as, transgender.-30  
 
Understanding gender identity in binary terms and conceiving it is a category that only applies to 
transgender people marginalizes the experiences of other people whose identities are constructed 
outside the binary spectrum, or even inside of it.31 Moreover, and as expressed by Diane Otto, most 
people have a gender identity, including those who identify as cisgender.32 
 
Gender in itself is just one of many identity marks. Some have even argued that there is no gender 
identity behind the expressions of gender because the identity itself is constructed performatively by 
the expression that are supposed to be its results.33  
 
Whether a result of its own expressions or as an identity based on a social construct, the truth is that 
‘we need a more liberatory and inclusive conception of gender in international law.’34 The limiting 
ways in which human rights law is gendered and the narrow conception of gender identity as a 
concept that reinforces the binary division of gender has discriminatory effects on people who deviate 
from the heteronorm. As a result of this, only those who can successfully frame their aggrievances 
as human rights issues with the current gender related language in which IHRL is codified get to be 
recognized as ‘humans’. Thus, dismantling the promise of universality in which IHRL was founded. 
Universality is an important concept in the discussion of gender and human rights. This term is usually 
‘used to denote the nature and validity of rights that are common to all human beings by virtue of their 
humanity’.35 However, when referring to human rights, most people do not usually mean this abstract 
                                            
30 ibid 
31 ibid 
32 ibid 
33 Judith Butler, ‘Gender Trouble: Feminism and the Subversion of Identity’, in Mary Evans and Carolyn H. 
Williams (Eds), Gender: The Key Concepts (2013) 109 
34 Otto (n 20) 300 
35 Bantekas and Oette (n 1) 38 
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concept but rather the norms contained in the UDHR or the International Bill of Rights.3637 All three 
instruments set out fundamental rights that are supposed to be universally protected and that aim at 
protecting the human person.  
Human rights were originally conceived to pertain to everyone, everywhere and under any 
circumstance.38 Nevertheless, their universal aspiration has been deemed to be the embodiment of 
ethnocentric, politically biased and narrow conceptions by some.39 
Critics have argued that the human rights regime as a whole constitutes a new form of imperialism.40 
The most prominent expression of such allegation is based on a defense of certain cultural values 
that are in stark contrast to the promise of universality. This is how, at the other side of the debate, 
cultural relativism is found.  
In her book Gender and Culture, Anne Phillips takes cultural relativism to be the ‘view that norms of 
justice are always relative to the society in which they are formed, such view reflects values and 
practices that may vary enormously from one society to another.’41 This is the reason why for critics 
who are more in favor of cultural relativism is inappropriate to measure the norms that emerge within 
one society as the measure against which to assess the practices of another.42 Moreover, they argue 
that the human rights paradigm presents a western discourse that generates a prejudicial narrative 
of non-western others, and that its conceptualization does not take into account their own conceptions 
of rights and human dignity. As stated by An-Na’im the main argument against the cultural legitimacy 
of the present internationally recognized standards of human rights in general, is often made on the 
ground that the basic conception and major principles expressed in these standards emerged from 
                                            
36 Annette Forster, ‘The Concept of Human Rights - Dissolving the Universality-Plurality Puzzle’ (2016) 10 
HR&ILD 186  
37 The International Bill of Rights is comprised by the UDHR (1948), the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights (ICCPR, 1996) and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 
(ICESCR, 1966). 
38 Jack Donelly, ‘Human Rights’ in John S. Dryzek, Bonnie Honig, and Anne Phillips (Eds), The Oxford 
Handbook of Political Theory (The Oxford Handbook of Political Science 2008) 601 
39 Bantekas and Oette (n 1) 37 
40 Forster (n 36) 196  
41 Anne Phillips, Gender and Culture (Polity Press, 2010) 16 
42 ibid 
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western philosophical and political developments and have little representation from non-western 
societies, their values and the particular challenges that they face.43   
Cultural relativism presents a dilemma to the universality of human rights, and it does even more to 
the rights of women and people who experience sexual orientation and gender identity in diverse and 
non-normative ways. Even though the universal human rights regime serve  male-defined interests 
and turn invisible the different challenges faced by different women and LGBTI+ persons across the 
globe,44 cultural relativism has proven to make moral agents indifferent to immoral situations most of 
the times,45 and has provided a perspective where culture can easily become an excuse for abuse.46 
 
An example of this can be easily found in one of the regional and third world approaches to 
international human rights law, the Cairo Declaration on Human Rights in Islam (CDHRI). Although 
this instrument gives account of a consensus over certain universal human rights norms that are 
deemed to be fundamental for the development of the human life, even those rights are subjected to 
the dictates of the Shari’a law,47 which clearly condemns same-sex relationships, labeling them as 
sodomy, and usually punishing them with flogging or death by stoning.48 
  
Excusing the disadvantages and violent practices that women and LGBTI+ persons have to face by 
appealing to cultural or religious differences is in fact protecting the abuses and inequalities 
experienced by these groups. The truth is that culture, as a social phenomenon, has the ability to 
change overtime, it is not immutable, and it should stop being conceived as such in detriment of 
people’s rights. Deconstructing violence against women and LGBTI+ persons necessarily involves 
changing the prejudicial attitudes that culture often preserves and reproduces. Rao had a similar 
                                            
43 Abdullahi Ahmed An-Na’im, ‘State Responsibility Under International Human Rights Law to Change 
Religious and Customary Laws’ in Rebecca J. Cook, Human Rights of Women: National and International 
Perspectives (University of Pennsylvania Press,1994) 171 
44 Niamh Reilly, Women’s Human Rights (Polity, 2009) 3 
45 Jane K. Cowan, Marie-Benedicte Dembour and Richard A. Wilson, Culture and Rights (Cambridge 
University Press, 2001) 59 
46 ibid 
47 Article 24 of the CDHRI states that ‘all the rights and freedoms stipulated in this Declaration are subject to 
the Islamic Shari'a.’  
48 Sabine Schmidtke, ‘Homoeroticism and Homosexuality in Islam: A Review Article’ (1999), Bulletin of the 
School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London 260 
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position in this matter when she shared her concerns that women’s human rights cannot be realized 
as long as ‘falsely rigid, ahistorical, and selectively chosen’ definitions of culture persist in the human 
rights thinking and practice.49 Relying on cultural tradition to legitimate these abuses and types of 
violence against women and LGBTI+ persons only reinforces the patriarchal power and 
heteronormativity embedded in IHRL.50 
 
Returning to the discussion on the normative conception of gender and its discriminatory effects on 
LGBTI+ persons and people who are out of the binary spectrum, and having a better understanding 
of what universality and its critiques are, is time to delve into the realm of queer theories and the 
necessity of implementing a queer approach in IHRL.  
 
What are queer theories and how can they contribute to a more inclusive understanding of IHRL? It 
is hard to find a standard definition of what queer theories are given that is in their very nature to 
challenge any normative and fix definitions. However it is fair to asseverate that their genesis is related 
to some of the most progressist feminist theories.51 In fact, and to be more precise, this theoretical 
model was developed out of lesbian and gay studies.52 Some of its main characteristics are that it 
challenges/resists normative conventions and models, and it refuses to define itself in the name of its 
indeterminacy and elasticity.53 
 
The term ‘queer’ has also been used to encompass anyone whose sexuality or gender falls outside 
the heteronorm, ‘whether they are asexual, gender-nonconforming, kinky, polyamorous or LGBT.’54 
 
                                            
49 Arati Rao, ‘The Politics of Gender and Culture in International Human Rights Discourse’, in Reilly Niamh, 
Women’s Human Rights (Polity, 2009) 7 
50 Phillips (n 41) 
51 Diane Richardson, ‘Bordering Theory’, in Diane Richardson, Janice McLaughlin and Mark E. Casey (Eds), 
Intersections Between Feminist and Queer Theory (Palgrave Macmillan, 2006) 19 
52 Annamarie Jagose, Queer Theory: An Introduction (New York University Press, 1996) 1 
53 ibid 
54 Ray Simon, ‘Stirring up the origin of the ‘alphabet soup’ (Philadelphia Gay News, October 18, 2017) 
available at: < http://www.epgn.com/special-editions/219-lgbt-history-month-2017/12651-stirring-up-the-origin-
of-the-alphabet-soup> Accessed August 09 2019  
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Taking these two premises into consideration and for the purposes of this paper, I take queer theories 
to be the set of radical theories that question the dominant and normative order in which IHRL was 
first conceived, in order to offer an emancipatory understanding of it, one that focus specially on 
issues of sexualities and identities that do not conform to the mandates of conservative and 
heternormal perspectives of gender. 
 
The queer theories deconstructionist approaches to gender aim to disrupt and denaturalize sexual 
and gender categories in order to recognize the fluidity, instability and fragmentation of identities.55 
They recognize as well that the current categories of gender exist with the particular political utility 
that is to contest material inequalities.56 However, they stress that such categories ‘rather than a 
stable marker of identity are in fact a fundamentally unreliable and inconsistent measure through 
which gender variant and gender non-conforming subjects are policed in and through increasingly 
violent and oppressive practices of securitization.’57 
 
They also acknowledge that the ‘legitimacy of the gendered social order can be subverted at the level 
of its underlying discourse – its biological assumptions, its binarism and its socially constructed 
gender differences.’58 They sustain that this order can be challenged by non-gendered practices in 
ordinary interaction such as in language and in the formulation of the law. 59 
 
Finally, in the light of queer theories, I argue that the invention of human rights and more particularly 
the inclusion of a heteronormative conception of gender that focuses primarily on the male/female 
division, has created a new classification of what it means to be human or better yet of who gets to 
be perceived as one under international human rights law. As a result of this, male subjectivities have 
been privileged by being conceived as fully human; and gender identities, mostly the ones of women 
                                            
55 Richardson (n 51) 
56 ibid 22 
57 Silvia Posocco, ‘Gender Identity’, in Mary Evans and Carolyn H. Williams (Eds), Gender: The Key Concepts 
(2013) 112 
58 Judith Lorber, ‘Using gender to undo gender: a feminist degendering movement’ [2000] Feminist Theory 79, 
95 
59 ibid 
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and to a lesser extent the ones of trans persons, have been progressively naturalized but placed into 
a secondary status.60 Simply put, this developments in the field of gender have reaffirmed that ‘human 
rights do not belong to humans and do not follow the dictates of humanity; they construct humans. A 
human being is someone who can successfully claim human rights.’61 Thus, deviating from the 
heteronormativity in which human rights is codified means that one is less human under IHRL.  
  
                                            
60 Otto (n 21) 197 
61 Douzinas Costas ‘Critique and Comment: The End(s) Of Human Rights’ (Melbourne University Law Review, 
2002) available at: <http://www5.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MelbULawRw/2002/23.html#fn18> Accessed 
August 13, 2019 
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OVERVIEW OF THE SITUATION OF SOGIESC RIGHTS 
 
LGBTI+ persons, and others who do not necessarily fit into any fix categories of gender, are subjected 
to human rights violations all over the world. In many places, states and societies continue to impose 
gender and sexual orientation norms on individuals through violent and oppressive practices that find 
their expression in customs and laws, which in most cases aim at controlling how people experience 
personal relationships and how they identify themselves.62 
 
The types of violations experienced vary from country to country and take many different forms. 
They range from: 
 
 [T]he denial of the right to life, freedom from torture and security of the person to 
discrimination in accessing economic, social and cultural rights such as health, housing, 
education and the right to work, from non-recognition of personal and family relationships to 
pervasive interferences with personal dignity, suppression of diverse sexual identities, 
attempts to impose heterosexual norms, and pressure to remain silent and invisible.63 
 
Despite a shared feeling of progress in most of the Global North and a few countries from the Global 
South, those who transgress the heteronormative understandings of gender and sexual orientation 
continue to face criminalization, discrimination, hatred, violence and other types of rights violation 
worldwide. 
 
As of 2019, 70 UN Member States -which comprise 35% of all Member States of the Organization- 
criminalize consensual same-sex relationships and/or acts.64 Out of these, 68 have laws in place that 
                                            
62 Introduction of the Yogyakarta Principles: Principles on the Application of International Human Rights Law in 
Relation so Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity (2007) available at: 
<https://yogyakartaprinciples.org/principles-en/> Accessed 24 August 2019 
63 Michael O’Flaherty and John Fisher, ‘Sexual Orientation, Gender Identity and International Human Rights 
Law: Contextualising the Yogyakarta Principles’, (2008) 8:2 HRLR 207-48 
64 International Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Trans and Intersex Association (ILGA): Lucas Ramon Mendos, ‘State 
Sponsored Homophobia’ (ILGA WORLD, 2019) 15 
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explicitly criminalize said relations or acts and in the remaining 2 the criminalization occurs de facto. 
In addition to this, other countries which are not members of the UN also criminalize such 
relations/acts (Gaza, the Cook Islands and certain provinces in Indonesia).65 26 of these 70 countries, 
criminalize such acts committed only by men; the other 44 criminalize them among all genders.66 
 
6 UN Member States punish these acts with the death penalty. Additionally, said penalty remains a 
possibility in another 5 Member States.67  
 
In regard to freedom of expression and association, 32 UN Member States have provisions that 
restrict freedom of expression in relation to SOGI issues.68 ‘This includes laws and regulations that 
prohibit media or web content as well as propaganda laws that prohibit the promotion of 
“homosexuality” or “nontraditional” sexual relations.’69 41 countries have laws in place that limit the 
chances of registering or running NGOs that work on SOGIESC issues.70 
 
In most of these countries, the laws that criminalize same-sex relations are portrayed as laws against 
‘public scandals’, ‘immorality’, ‘sodomy’ and ‘indecent behavior’.71 Other excuses are also used to 
penalise people for their diverse or non-normative sexual orientations, gender identities/expressions 
or for simply deviating from the constricted social norms. Even when criminal sanctions are not 
actively enforced, these laws are still used to arbitrarily harass or detain LGBTI+ persons, sex 
advocates and others, because of their actual or perceived sexual orientation or gender 
identity/expression.72 
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Sexual orientation, gender identity/expression and sexual characteristics have always been 
controversial issues in the international arena and throughout most of the human history. 
Homosexuality and other forms of same-sex desire and non-conforming identities have been 
stigmatized and treated as mental disorders or diseases. The World Health Organization (WHO) 
published in 1948 its 6th issue of the International Classification of Diseases and Related Health 
Problems (ICD), which was the first version to include mental disorders.73 This document classified 
homosexuality as a sexual deviation that was presumed to result from a personality disorder.74 It was 
not until 1990 that this prejudiced view was voted off the ICD.75 The fact that the WHO considered 
homosexuality as a mental illness contributed greatly to the stigmatization of non-heteronormative 
sexual orientations and gender identities/expressions, and amounted to the violence and 
discrimination that LGBTI+ persons had to endure. 
 
Fairly recently, in 2018, the WHO announced that they planned to remove ‘gender incongruence’ -
the term coined by the Organization to refer to people whose gender identity is different from the 
gender they were assigned at birth- from the 11th edition of the ICD.76 Such pathologization of trans 
identities translated into more challenges and barriers for trans persons that were soon transferred to 
the legal realm (making harder for trans persons to change their legal name or gender, and to access 
health services without previously presenting a psychiatric evaluation).  
 
The case is still the same as it was decades ago for intersex people. In its ICD 11, the WHO not only 
did not remove the classification of intersex as a disorder but added a new diagnoses focusing on the 
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treatment of intersex children.77 This new diagnosis called  ‘gender incongruence of childhood’ was 
strongly opposed by trans and intersex advocates.78 Every year intersex children are subjected to 
non-emergency invasive and irreversible surgeries and similar medical treatments that violate their 
rights, among which are the rights of the child, the right to physical and bodily integrity and the right 
to the highest attainable standard of health.79 
 
As for people who do not fit into binary understandings of gender or who are not abided by any gender 
categories, such as gender non-conforming, agenders, gender fluids, among others; the mainstream 
conversations of gender do not usually include them and turn their experiences invisible to a greater 
extent than those who identify as LGBTI+. On top of the discrimination that they receive for being 
perceived as LGBTI+, they must face having their identities not recognized or being labeled as 
‘fictitious’ in major conversions around sexual orientation and gender identity/expressions, mostly by 
government and some religious actors and institutions.80 
 
Going back to the situation of LGBTI+ persons in the WHO context: in 2013 the Organization’s 
Secretariat made its first report regarding health issues related to LGBTI+ persons. Nevertheless, 
many member states strongly opposed this development and successfully removed the item from the 
Executive Board meeting agenda in which was supposed to be presented.81 In regards to the 
opposition, ‘some states argued that “non-heteronormative behaviors are by themselves a risky 
choice of an unhealthy lifestyle that should be discouraged and altered.”’82 
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It is not new nor rare that states try to impede the inclusion of LGBTI+ issues in international 
discussions. However, it is at this level that efforts to incorporate SOGIESC concerns are most 
necessary and have proven to be extremely beneficial.  
 
Despite all of the challenges and barriers that LGBTI+ persons still have to face all over the world, 
some positive developments have been achieved at the international, regional and domestic levels.  
 
In terms of protections from discrimination, 9 UN Member States constitutionally prohibit 
discrimination on SOGI grounds.83 A total of 74 countries have laws in place that prohibit employment 
discrimination on the ground of sexual orientation. 52 of these countries count with broad legal 
protections on the basis of sexual orientation -usually applicable in regards to goods and services-
health related issues and education.84 39 of them enacted laws to punish hate crimes, discrimination 
and other types of violence based on sexual orientation.85 28 countries now allow for same-sex 
marriage.8687 
 
Moreover, at the international and regional levels, developments such as the Yogyakarta Principles, 
the appointment of an Independent Expert on Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity at the UN, the 
creation of a Core Group on the Rights of Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Trans, and Intersex Persons 
(LGBTI) at  the Organization of American States (OAS), the Recommendation CM/Rec(2010)5 of the 
Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe to its member states on measures to combat 
discrimination on grounds of sexual orientation or gender identity, are some of the milestones in the 
history of the expansion of SOGIESC rights in IHRL. 
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YOGYAKARTA PRINCIPLES  
 
The Yogyakarta Principles represented an important step in the international arena for LGBTI+ 
activists. They are a set of 29 principles that were compiled at an experts meeting in Yogyakarta, 
Indonesia in 2007. That year, the International Commission of Jurists (ICJ) and the International 
Service for Human Rights (ISHR), on behalf of a coalition of human rights organizations, decided to 
undertake the project of drafting these principles in order to redress the inconsistencies and close the 
gaps that existed in IHRL when addressing SOGIESC issues.88 The principles, therefore, deal with 
the application of human rights law in the context of SOGIESC rights, and set forth the obligations 
States are required to take to make sure LGBTI+ persons are able to enjoy their rights.89 
 
This instrument is of a non-binding nature, and it does not create new rights as much as it articulates 
the rights that all humans already hold. All 29 principles are ‘based on international human rights law 
as reflected in international and regional treaties; the jurisprudence of human rights treaty bodies and 
specialised courts and commissions; authoritative interpretation by the special rapporteurs and 
working groups of the UN; expert opinion; and state practice.’90 
 
The Principles sought to be comprehensive in their scope, ‘both in terms of the rights covered by the 
law and also in relation to the actual lived experience of LGBTI people.’91 This was accomplished 
thanks to the combined expertise of the 29 drafters, some of which had either first-hand experience 
of rights violations or deep knowledge of the evolution of human rights law to address such 
violations.92 
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There is also an order to the Principles, the first three set out the Principles of the universality of 
human rights and of non-discrimination, as well as the right of all people to equal recognition before 
the law.93 The following eight Principles (4 to 11) address the fundamental rights to life, freedom from 
violence and torture, privacy, access to justice and freedom from arbitrary detention.94 The next set 
of Principles (12 to 18) highlight the importance of non-discrimination in the enjoyment of economic, 
social and cultural rights.95 Principles 19 to 21 are related to the rights of freedom of expression, 
opinion and association. They stress the ‘importance of the freedom to express oneself, one’s identity 
and one’s sexuality, without State interference’,96 and they include the rights to participate in public 
assemblies and to associate in community with others. Principles 22 and 23 are related to the freedom 
of movement and asylum in cases of persecution based on sexual orientation and gender identity.97 
Principles 24 to 26 ‘address the rights of persons to participate in family life, public affairs and the 
cultural life of their community, without discrimination based on sexual orientation or gender identity.’98 
Principle 27 recognizes the rights of human rights defenders to defend and promote human rights 
without discrimination. Finally, Principles 28 and 29 are the rights to redress and accountability, 
meaning the right to hold human rights violators accountable for their acts and the right to ensure 
redress for those who experienced rights violations.99 
 
All of these Principles are to be enjoyed by everyone and should not be considered to apply only to 
a particular or unique group.100 The right to be treated with humanity while in detention, for example, 
applies to all people, but particular claims seeking this right can be different depending on who makes 
the claim (heterosexual, lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, intersex, etc.) and the way in which the 
right was violated.101 
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It is also important to remark that the language of the Yogyakarta Principles was intentionally phrased 
in a neutral way. Some have argued that this has the potential to exclude the experiences of certain 
groups.102 However, it allows for a broader understanding of the applicability of the Principles without 
referencing the binary gender framework, which in turn enables people who choose an identity 
outside the binary spectrum to be abided by them.103 
 
The Principles represented the state of IHRL at the time they were produced. Therefore the drafters 
anticipated that they would need to be updated regularly.104 The first update came in September 
2017, when a group of experts met in Geneva and created a set of 10 supplemental Principles, which 
were named the Yogyakarta Principles Plus 10.105 These new Principles recognize gender identity 
and sex characteristics as additional bases for rights violations in their preamble.106 Thus, they have 
a more comprehensive approach to SOGIESC issues. The 9 Principles that follow the preamble 
include each a list of recommendations for States.107 The first Principle -numbered 30 so as to take 
up from where the previous Principles left off- focuses on the right to State protection from Violence 
and Discrimination.108 Principle 31 deals with the right to legal recognition and the right to change 
gender information when this requirement is included. The following Principle (32) highlights the 
importance of bodily and mental integrity, autonomy and self-determination, and sets out the ‘right to 
be free from torture and cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment or punishment on the basis of sexual 
orientation, gender identity, gender expression and sex characteristics.’109 In terms of sex 
characteristics, this Principle also states that ‘no one shall be subjected to invasive or irreversible 
medical procedures that modify sex characteristics without their free, prior and informed consent, 
unless necessary to avoid serious, urgent and irreparable harm to the concerned person.’110 
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Principles 33, 34 and 35, address the rights to freedom from criminalization, protection from poverty 
and the rights to sanitation respectively. The following Principle (36) focuses on the issue of human 
rights in regard to information and communication technologies. Finally, the last two Principles deal 
with the rights to truth (37) and the rights to cultural diversity (38).111 The supplementary Principles 
also include State recommendations in relation to the implementation of the first Principles.  
 
Ever since the creation of the Principles, activists all over the world have used them as a tool to 
enhance the effectiveness of their fight for the expansion of rights.112 They have contributed to 
challenge oppressive legal standards in countries such as India and Nepal; to develop new and more 
comprehensive government policies with a SOGIESC perspective in Brazil, Sweden and Colombia; 
to educate the public in general about the legal standards to protect LGBTI+ persons; and to build a 
movement by equipping activists with knowledge about SOGIESC rights.113 
 
UNITED NATIONS 
 
The first time a consideration was made in regards to SOGIESC issues at the UN level was in 1982, 
in Hertzberg v Finland114 at the Human Rights Committee (HRC).115 At that moment, the HRC 
dismissed a claim made by five individuals, represented by the Finnish organization, SETA 
(Organization for Sexual Equality) in regards to Article 19 of the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights (ICCPR).116 It was not until 1994, however, that real progress was made in this 
Committee in relation to sexual orientation.117 That year, in the case of Toonen v Australia,118 the 
HRC agreed that Tasmania’s sodomy laws, which prohibited same-sex consensual acts, were in 
                                            
111 ibid 
112 An Activist’s Guide to the Yogyakarta Principles (n 88) 87 
113 ibid 
114 UN Human Rights Committee (HRC), ‘Hertzberg et al v Finland, Communication No. 61/1979’ (2 April 1982) 
UN Doc.CCPR/C/OP/1 
115 Gemma MacArthur, ‘Securing Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity Rights within the United Nations 
Framework and System: Past, Present and Future’ (2015) 15 The Equal Rights Review 25 - 54 
116 ibid 
117 ibid 
118 HRC, ‘Toonen v Australia, Communication No. 488/1992’, (25 December 1992) UN Doc. CCPR/C/50D/488 
 28 
violation of Article 17 of the Covenant, which set out the right to privacy.119 This decision by the HRC 
was deemed to be the first ‘juridical recognition of gay rights on a universal level.’120 
 
Since Toonen v Australia, there has been a growing jurisprudence and other developments in 
different UN bodies that identify a significant application of IHRL in matters related to SOGIESC 
issues.121  
The Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (CESCR), for example,  has addressed the 
issue of non-discrimination on the bases of SOGI in its General Comments.122123 The Committee on 
the Rights of the Child (CRC) has also dealt with this same issue through General Comments, where 
it has covered sexual orientation by locating it in the category of ‘other status.’124 The Committee 
Against Torture (CAT) has expressed concern about the torture of homosexuals through its 
concluding observations.125126 The CEDAW Committee, in its General Recommendation No.28 on 
the core obligations of States parties under Article 2 of the CEDAW Convention also included sexual 
orientation and gender identity as factors that amount to the intersectionality of the discrimination 
faced by women.127 The Working Group on Arbitrary Detention has repeatedly used the case of 
Toonen as a basis for its findings of arbitrary detention of LGBTI+ persons.128 
 
Some Special Procedures that have also engaged with issues of SOGIESC include the Special 
Rapporteur (SP) on contemporary forms of racism, racial discrimination, xenophobia and related 
intolerance;  the SP on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions; torture and other cruel, 
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inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment; freedom of religion; violence against women; among 
others.129 
 
There have also been important developments within the political bodies of the UN. The first 
significant effort to affirm broad protection for sexual orientation occurred in the former Commission 
on Human Rights, when in 2003 the government of Brazil pushed for a resolution on human rights 
and sexual orientation.130 This resolution stressed that the application of the rights contained in the 
foundational documents of IHRL also applied to people who experience sexual orientation in diverse 
ways. Such document sparkled an important wave of criticism.131 The States that opposed feared 
that new rights regarding SOGI would be created. Finally, after much postponement, Brazil dropped 
the resolution.132 However, this unsuccessful effort resulted in a joint statement supported by 54 
states, which stated that violations of human rights based on SOGI should not be ignored. Despite 
the little value and strength this statement had, it was the first one ever to include concerns related 
to SOGI.133 
 
5 years later, in 2008, a significant discussion on SOGI would take place again but in the framework 
of the 63rd session of the General Assembly. This time the Netherlands and France would present a 
document titled ‘UN Declaration on Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity.’134 Said instrument 
‘affirmed the application of non-discrimination principles, and condemned a number of abuses such 
as the criminalization of same-sex relations, and violence and torture.’135 However it was not until 
2011 that a substantial milestone would be reached in terms of advancing SOGI rights. That year the 
Human Rights Council adopted resolution 17/19, which expressed concern for the discriminatory and 
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violent acts that LGBTI+ persons faced worldwide.136 Following this advancement, the Office of the 
High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) was requested to conduct a study on SOGI 
abuses.137 This important step would pave the way for the development of the most important 
specialized mechanism of the UN for the promotion and protection of SOGI rights up until now. 
Resolution 32/2 adopted by the Human Rights Council in 2016 created the mandate for an 
Independent Expert on Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity.138 The mandate holder, who works 
as part of the UN Special Procedures, was appointed to ‘assess the implementation of existing 
international human rights instruments, with regard to ways to overcome violence and discrimination 
against persons on the basis of their sexual orientation or gender identity, and to identify and address 
the root causes of violence and discrimination.’139 Additionally, the Independent Expert (IE) must raise 
awareness on violence and discrimination against LGBTI+ persons; transmit urgent appeals and 
letters of allegation to States regarding cases of violence and discrimination based on SOGI; 
undertake fact-finding country visits; submit annual reports to the HRC and the General Assembly on 
the situation of SOGI issues and on other activities carried out in this regard, among other tasks.140 
In July 2019, the mandate of the Independent Expert on SOGI was renewed during the 41st session 
of the Human Rights Council, through a resolution adopted by a vote of 27 States in favour, 12 against 
and 7 abstentions.141 
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INTER-AMERICAN SYSTEM OF HUMAN RIGHTS 
 
The Organization of American States (OAS) is the world’s oldest regional organization. It came into 
being in 1948 after the signing of the OAS Charter in Bogota, Colombia.142 The adoption of the Charter 
and the American Declaration on the Rights and Duties of Man also in 1948, which predates the 
UDHR, marks the first steps of the Organization towards the consolidation of the Inter-American 
Human Rights System. Following the Declaration, the American Convention on Human Rights 
(ACHR) -or the Pact of San José, Costa Rica- was adopted in 1969. By then, the Inter-American 
Commission of Human Rights was already in place. However, it was with the adoption of the ACHR 
that the Inter-American Court of Human Rights was established.143 
 
The Inter-American System of Human Rights is comprised by these two organs (the Commission and 
the Court) which have competence with respect to matters relating to the fulfillment of the 
commitments made by the states to the ACHR. The Commission became a consultative organ after 
the adoption of the Convention, and it undertakes a number of activities for the promotion and 
protection of human rights in the Americas, which include carrying out country visits and country 
reports and creating publications of specially commissioned studies.144 The Court on the other hand 
has contentious jurisdiction over the states that have ratified the Convention and have explicitly 
accepted its jurisdiction. It rules on cases submitted to it by the Commission or State Parties and is 
the last resort within the system.145  
 
In regards to issues of SOGIESC, the Commission has received ample information on the situation 
of LGBTI+ persons in the Americas, particularly regarding the discrimination and violence that these 
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persons have to face in many countries of the American continent on the basis of sexual orientation, 
gender identity/expression and sexual characteristics.146 The first case lodged to the Commission on 
sexual orientation came in 1996, when Maria Lucia Alvarez petitioned this organ alleging that prison 
authorities in Colombia discriminated against her by refusing her conjugal visits with her same-sex 
partner. Ultimately, the Commission ruled in 1999 that the case was admissible, and a friendly 
settlement was reached.147 In addition to this, a number of petitions on SOGIESC issues have been 
submitted to the Commission and two cases have been ruled by the Court related to sexual 
orientation.148149 
 
In terms of resolutions, the General Assembly of the OAS -the supreme organ of the Organization- 
has issued 9 documents focusing on human rights, sexual orientation and gender identity.150 A core 
group on LGBTI issues was formed in 2016 to support the implementation of mandates contained in 
said resolutions. The group is comprised by Argentina, Brazil, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Mexico, the 
United States, and Uruguay. 151   
 
Additionally, the Inter-American Commission counts with a Rapporteur on the Rights of LGBTI 
Persons. Such advancement was achieved in 2011 in the framework of the 143rd Period of Sessions 
of the Commission, when a specialized unit was created within the Executive Secretariat of this 
organ.152 
 
                                            
146 OAS, ‘IACHR Creates Unit on the Rights of Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Trans, and Intersex Persons’ (2011) 
available at <http://www.oas.org/en/iachr/media_center/PReleases/2011/115.asp> Accessed 26 August 2019 
147 An Activist’s Guide to the Yogyakarta Principles (n 88) 26 
148 Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (IACHR), ‘Reports on Petitions and Cases’, available at: 
<https://www.oas.org/en/iachr/lgtbi/decisions/iachr.asp> Accessed 26 August 2019 
149 See also Case of Atala Riffo and Daughter v. Chile: Merits, Reparations and Costs. Inter-American Court of 
Human Rights Series C No 239 (February 24, 2012) 
<http://corteidh.or.cr/docs/casos/articulos/seriec_239_ing.pdf> Accessed 27 August 2019; Caso Duque Vs. 
Colombia: Excepciones Preliminares, Fondo, Reparaciones y Costas. Sentencia de 26  de  febrero  de  2016.  
Serie  C  No.  310. available in Spanish at: 
<http://www.corteidh.or.cr/docs/casos/articulos/seriec_310_esp.pdf> 
150 OAS, ‘Rapporteurship on the Rights of LGBTI Persons’, available at 
<http://www.oas.org/en/iachr/lgtbi/links/> Accessed 27 August 2019 
151 OAS, ‘IACHR Welcomes Creation of LGBTI Core Group at the OAS’ available at: 
<https://www.oas.org/en/iachr/media_center/preleases/2016/097.asp> Accessed 27 August 2019 
152 OAS, ‘Rapporteurship on the Rights of LGBTI Persons’, available at <https://www.oas.org/en/iachr/lgtbi//> 
Accessed 27 August 2019 
 33 
So far, the Rapporteurship on LGBTI persons has produced two comprehensive reports about the 
situation of SOGIESC rights in the Americas. The first one, titled Violence Against LGBTI Persons in 
the Americas focuses on ‘the acts of physical violence committed against persons with non-normative 
sexual orientations, identities and gender expressions, or whose bodies vary from the standard for 
female and male bodies in the Americas.’153 The second and most recent report was launched in 
2018, and it examines the progress made in the Member States of the OAS to guarantee that LGBTI+ 
persons can lead fulfilling lives with full autonomy and respect for their own will and free from all forms 
of violence.154 This report is more comprehensive in its scope and it also contains guidelines ‘for 
building a more just and inclusive society, with respect for sexual orientation, gender identity -real or 
perceived- and body diversity, based on the recognition of specific rights.’155 
 
EUROPEAN SYSTEM OF HUMAN RIGHTS  
 
The major human rights instruments in the European System of Human Rights are the European 
Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, which was adopted by the Council of 
Europe (CoE) in 1950, and the European Social Charter, adopted in 1965.156 The Charter deals with 
economic, social and cultural rights while the Convention sets out civil and political rights. The CoE 
has adopted many conventions on issues such as torture, gender equality, national minorities, etc.157 
Much like the Inter-American System, the CoE has established a Court that rules on cases that deal 
with violations of human rights. However, there is a more robust and developed jurisprudence in the 
European System in regard to sexual orientation and gender identity.  
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Substantial progress on SOGIESC rights at the CoE was achieved in 2010 when the Committee of 
Ministers -the statutory decision-making body of the organization- issued a recommendation to 
Member States on measures to combat discrimination on grounds of sexual orientation or gender 
identity.158 The Secretary General of the CoE described this development as the ‘first legal instrument 
anywhere to deal specifically with this area.’159 This instrument sets out the applicability of a range of 
human rights to ensure the equal dignity of persons of diverse sexual orientations and gender 
identities.160 It also incorporates a number of  measures that Member States must take in order to 
guarantee the enjoyment of all human rights over time.161 The status of implementation of this 
recommendation was reviewed three years after its adoption and in regular intervals after that ime.162 
 
AFRICAN SYSTEM OF HUMAN RIGHTS 
 
The African Union (AU) -formerly known as the Organization of African Unity (OAU)- is the regional 
organization of the African continent.163 This continental body is comprised by all 55 states that make 
up the countries of the African Continent.164  
 
The African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights is the main instrument of the African Human 
Rights System, it was adopted in 1981 and entered into force five years later in 1986.165 Article 30 of 
the Charter established the African Commission on Human Rights, the main body tasked with the 
promotion and protection of the rights contained in the Charter which was inaugurated in 1987.166 
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The Commission also has the power to interpret the provisions of the Charter. The African Court on 
Human Rights came into being years later in 2004, by virtue of a Protocol to the Charter.167  
 
Of the three regional systems referenced in this paper, the African system is the least developed in 
handling issues of SOGIESC rights. The most important development in this regard was the adoption 
of Resolution 275 on the Protection against Violence and other Human Rights Violations against 
Persons on the Basis of their Real or Imputed Sexual Orientation or Gender Identity, during the 55th 
Ordinary Session of the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights in Luanda, Angola, in 
2014.168 Said resolution condemns the increasing violence and other human rights violations that 
LGBTI+ persons experience in most of the African continent, it calls on State Parties to ensure that 
human rights defenders can work in an environment free of stigma, reprisal, prosecution and 
discrimination and urges states to end all acts of violence and other abuses against LGBTI+ persons. 
This instrument was also a pivotal rejection to the claims of some that LGBTI+ rights were 
incompatible with the African values and culture.169 
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HOW IHRL HAS FAILED PEOPLE WHO DEVIATE FROM THE HETERONORM 
 
In September 2015, the Heads of State and Government and High Representatives meeting at the 
UN Headquarters in New York, in the framework of the 70th General Assembly of the Organization, 
adopted resolution 70/1 Transforming Our World: The 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development. 
This resolution was a plan of action for people, planet and prosperity that sought to strengthen 
universal peace in larger freedom.170 As the ambitious title suggests, the 2030 agenda promised a 
‘transformative’ plan of action.171 In its preamble and introduction, the world leaders and stakeholders 
pledged that no one would be left behind.172 
 
As utopian as this seems, the truth is that the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) did not 
explicitly call for equality for all but were unsurprisingly another reproduction of heteronormativity in 
the international arena. Goal number 5, which was set out to achieve gender equality, conceived this 
goal as a matter that applies only to ciswomen and girls. Although this in itself is a progress for the 
advancement and expansion of rights, its limiting scope only installed the heterosexual matrix in a 
new way and reinforced the prejudicial idea of women and girls’ secondary status while maintaining 
the privileged status of cismen as the only other gender recognized.173  It is not surprising, however, 
that the SDGs did not raise any direct concerns on SOGIESC issues, given that heteronormativity is 
as embedded in the approaches to development as it is in the approaches to IHRL.174 
 
While there have been some valuable developments in IHRL around SOGIESC issues -as exposed 
in the previous section- they have not been entirely adequate to address the needs of people who 
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experience sexual orientation and gender identity in diverse or non-normative ways. Most of the 
progress achieved has focused on the application of the principles of universality and non-
discrimination to LGBT persons.175 Fairly recently issues of sexual characteristics or bodily diversity 
have started to gain attention at the international level. Meanwhile non-conforming identities are still 
marginalized and sometimes even labeled as fictitious. The binarism underlying the conceptions of 
gender/gender identity have not been sufficiently challenged and heterosexuality remains the norm 
in the human rights paradigm.  
 
The former High Commissioner for Human Rights, Louise Arbour, had expressed concern about the 
inconsistency of approach in law and practice to SOGI issues. In an address to a LGBT forum she 
conveyed the need for a more comprehensive articulation of these rights in international law.176 Some 
commentators had also suggested that IHRL was not consistent in the terminology used to refer to 
SOGIESC issues. While this was especially true in past years before the more agreed use of the 
terms ‘SOGI’ and ‘SOGIESC’. there is still a marked inconsistency and multiple gaps in the way IHRL 
treats categories of gender. One example of this can be found in the context of the interpretation and 
application of the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees in regard to gender related 
issues.  
 
The Refugee Convention was originally adopted in 1951 in Geneva, Switzerland.177 However, this 
important instrument resulted from previous developments that took place in the aftermath of World 
Wars I and II, such as guidelines, laws and other international agreements set out to ensure the 
adequate treatment of refugees and to protect their human rights.178 The Convention spells out who 
is a refugee and defines refugees obligations to their host countries, it also specifies some categories 
of people who do not qualify for refugee status, such a war criminals.179 In the way it was first 
conceived, the Convention was more or less limited to protecting European refugees who were 
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victims of World War II, nevertheless, it was amended over a decade later with the 1967 Protocol.180 
The Protocol broadened the applicability of the 1951 Convention by removing the geographical and 
time limits set out in the Convention, which only contemplated the persons who became refugees due 
to the events occurring in Europe before 1st January 1951.181 
 
As most of the documents of the time in which the Convention was adopted, the language used in its 
creation was entirely masculine, narrating only the experiences of the cis, straight and white males 
who wrote it. There were no mentions to the particular ways in which women and people who 
experience sexual orientation and gender identity in diverse and non-normative ways were 
specifically affected by such events. Gay men who fought the wars had no protections whatsoever, 
and they were usually prosecuted and jailed by military authorities when returning to their home 
countries,182 LBT persons faced the same destiny. As for women, the way in which the Convention 
and its Protocol availed them was mostly by virtue of their relationship to men (as part of their 
families).183 The Convention, as most of IHRL, was interpreted as an instrument that protects citizens 
from abuses by their states, an arena that was dominated by men, and that ignored women’s 
persecutory experiences which mostly take place at the hands of non-state actors.184 All of this was 
of course a reflection of the androcentric concerns of the male European drafters that were already 
embedded in much of IHRL at that time and that universalized such concerns as ‘human’ concerns.185 
 
With the passing of years and due to changes in state practice, among other factors, gender-based 
violence made its way to the scope of the Convention. In 1993 Canada adopted the first guidelines 
to deal with asylum cases based on gender related issues.186 Other countries in the Global North 
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followed, and, as predicted by Valji, the foundation for an international norm that recognized gender 
as a nexus to persecution was established.187 
 
In October 1999 the Executive Committee of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees 
(UNHCR) noted in its General Conclusion on International Protection the efforts made by states to 
incorporate gender perspectives into asylum policies, regulations and practice; and encouraged 
States and the UNHCR Office to develop, promote and implement guidelines, codes of conduct and 
training programs on gender-related refugee issues.188  
 
In 2000 the UNHCR published a Position Paper on Gender-Related Persecution. This interpretative 
instrument offered a distinction between the categories of gender and sex, and defined the former as 
‘the relationship between women and men based on socially defined roles that are assigned to one 
sex or another.’189 The paper stressed that gender-related persecution -the term commonly used in 
refugee law to address claims based on gender violence- ‘encompassed acts of sexual violence, 
family violence, coerced family planning, female genital mutilation, punishment for transgression of 
social mores, and homosexuality.’190  
 
Only two years later after the publication of the Position Paper, the UNHCR adopted a set of 
guidelines on gender-related persecution within the context of Article 1A (2) of the 1951 Convention 
and its 1967 Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees. These guidelines replaced the previously 
released Position Paper. However, they still maintained some if its essential features. The guidelines 
recognized that the definition of refugee had been historically interpreted through a framework of male 
experiences.191 They also provided a more comprehensive definition of gender, which recognized the 
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social and cultural factors that influence its construction and understood it as non-static nor innate 
characteristic.192 
 
The guidelines make reference to sexual orientation as a possible ground for establishing a valid 
claim if homosexuals, transsexuals or transvestites have faced ‘extreme public hostility, violence, 
abuse, or severe or cumulative discrimination.’ or if homosexuality is illegal in a particular society.193 
Nonetheless they proved to be insufficient in addressing SOGIESC issues because of their limiting 
understanding of both sexual orientation and gender identity.  
 
These guidelines, as efficient as they could have been conceived to be, fail -when analyzed under a 
queer perspective- to challenge the heteronormativity of IHRL. Instead, they reaffirm the dualistic 
notions of gender even when referring to non-normative expressions of it (as in the case of trans 
persons) and try to assimilate diverse sexual orientations into a grid of intelligibility that has 
predominantly been male dominated and heterosexual. However, an asset of this development is its 
treatment of the category of gender as something that is both socially constructed and mutable.  
 
In 2012, ten years after the adoption of the Gender Guidelines, a new set of guidelines focusing 
particularly on sexual orientation and gender identity were issued by the UNHCR. The Guidelines on 
International Protection No.9 deal with claims to Refugee Status based on SOGI grounds within the 
context of Article 1(A) of the Refugee Convention and its 1967 Protocol. This interpretative instrument 
resulted from, and replaced, the UNHCR Guidance Note on Refugee Claims Relating to Sexual 
Orientation and Gender Identity, that was issued in 2008. The SOGI Guidelines, recognize that in 
‘many parts of the world, individuals experience serious human rights abuses and other forms of 
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persecution due to their actual or perceived sexual orientation and/or gender identity.’194 In this sense, 
they start by referencing the existing instruments and provision of IHRL that can provide protection 
to LGBTI+ persons. The first of these are Articles 1 and 2 of the UDHR, which state that “all human 
beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights” and set out the principle of non-discrimination. 
They then continue by mentioning the Yogyakarta Principles and their relevance in the context of 
seeking asylum, in particular they reference Principle 23, which outlines the right to seek and enjoy 
asylum from persecution related to sexual orientation and/or gender identity. They soon follow by 
providing a definition of both sexual orientation and gender identity and the acronym ‘LGBTI’. In this 
section one of the first flaws in regard to the way the instrument addresses issues of gender can be 
found. The guidelines state that ‘gender identity and its expression also take many forms, with some 
individuals identifying neither as male nor female, or as both.’ This statement presents a clear 
confusion between the concept of gender as a social category and of sex as biologically determined. 
Male and female are both attributes related to the category of sex and treating them as categories of 
identity in relation to gender is rather imprecise. Nevertheless, this mixing of terminology is not the 
biggest inconsistency nor the most troublesome aspect of the guidelines.  
 
In their introduction, the guidelines express that the experiences of LGBTI persons vary greatly and 
are strongly influenced by many factors such as culture, economy, family, political views, religion, and 
social environment. They also stress the importance that ‘decisions on LGBTI refugee claims are not 
based on superficial understandings of the experiences of LGBTI persons, or on erroneous, culturally 
inappropriate or stereotypical assumptions.’195 However, in practice, asylum seekers are more likely 
to be granted refugee status if they act up to flamboyant stereotypes.196 Very recently, in August 
2019, a middle eastern man seeking asylum in the UK got his claim rejected by a judge because he 
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was not ‘effeminate’ enough to be gay.197 In another case, an Iraqi gay man was denied asylum in 
Austria because he was too girlish, and was labeled as a ‘fake gay.’198 Furthermore, and despite their 
own statement, the guidelines themselves may amount to the stereotyping of non-normative sexual 
orientations and gender identities.  
 
Section IV of the guidelines give a substantial analysis of SOGIESC concerns. Paragraph 12 goes 
on to say that both sexual orientation and gender identity, as affirmed by a number of jurisdictions, 
are fundamental aspects of human identity that are either immutable and innate or that a person 
should not be required to give up or conceal. While the latter affirmation is completely adequate, 
stating that sexual orientation and gender identity are inherent and unchangeable traits of human 
personality is in stark contrast with the understanding of gender as a socially constructed category. 
Understanding gender identity as a monolithic entity and in binary concepts that apply only to men or 
women (whether cis or trans) should be resisted, since is without a doubt an exercise that 
circumscribes progress on SOGIESC to the dominancy of the heteronorm. Otto had already 
expressed a similar view in this regard when stating that ‘simply trying to press diverse gender (and 
sexuality) subjectivities into the dominant grid of binary gender and heterosexual normativity as 
reflected in mainstream international law, merely installs the heterosexual matrix in a particular new 
form.’199 
 
Moreover, the views that any sexual orientation is by nature ‘innate’ is neither verifiable not 
quantifiable. There is no consensus across a wide range of scientific disciplines that this quality is the 
sole product of neither social conditions or that is innate nor fixed at an early age.200  
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The conception of these attributes as innate and immutable, responds to the imperative need of IHRL 
to normalize all phenomena that deviates from the heteronorm. IHRL has historically taken the abuses 
of those who assert difference and colonized their experiences in order to make them comfortable to 
its own structures, or better said, the structures of the nation states.201 
 
This need of IHRL to normalize has in turn created very fix understandings of SOGIESC issues that 
stereotype the experiences of persons with diverse and/or non-normative sexual orientations and 
gender identities, and impact negatively their efforts to escape situations of human rights violations. 
In the case Lipdjio v. Canada,202 a woman from Cameroon who was seeking asylum in the country 
and who was raped when she was 17 years old claimed that the trauma from this violent event had 
led her to her lesbian sexual orientation. The Immigration and Refugee Board did not believe that the 
claimant could be a lesbian because she had discovered her sexual orientation after the assault rather 
than admitting it was innate.203 However, the Federal Court stated that the conclusion of the Board 
was not verifiable nor quantifiable and it held that the Board had therefore erred when manifesting 
that it had specialized knowledge that ‘homosexuality is innate.’204 The Court thus concluded that the 
Board’s view on homosexuality as something innate had affected the assessment of the claimant’s 
credibility and ultimately her claim.205 
 
This instrument contains another problematic factor related to non-normative gender identities, one 
that is deeply rooted in the binary and heteronormative conceptions of gender. In paragraph 47, the 
guidelines state that ‘where the identity of the applicant is still evolving, they may describe their sexual 
orientation and/or gender identity as fluid or they may express confusion or uncertainty about their 
sexuality and/or identity.’206 Understanding gender fluidity and other non-conforming gender identities 
as transitory or unevolved phases rather than actual, valid and complete identity marks because they 
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reject, deconstruct or fluctuate between the dualistic and normative notions of gender is another way 
to pathologize people who identify as non-binary, non-conforming, gender fluid, agender, etc. 
Moreover, is one more proof that the binary gender divisions deeply bifurcate the structure of modern 
society and undergird the continually reappearing instances of gender inequality.207 
 
Another instrument that has failed to respond to the specificity of the needs of people who experience 
sexual orientation and gender identity in diverse or non-normative ways is the Yogyakarta Principles.  
As valuable as these Principles have been in the fight for the expansion of SOGIESC rights, they are 
still circumscribed within the framework of the heteronorm.  
 
While the Principles were envisioned for the purpose of seeking a response to stigma, violence and 
discrimination faced by people due to biased perceptions of their sexual orientations and/or gender 
identities/expressions and/or sex characteristics, their goal is far from being achieved.208 Given that 
the Principles were created to reflect the current state of IHRL, their signatories were bound by 
international law in the drafting process.209 This, rather than contesting the shortcomings of IHRL in 
regards to SOGIESC issues, meant that the Principles were written assuming that LGBTI+ persons 
are just like heterosexual cisgender people.210  
 
In the core dialogues during the genesis of the Yogyakarta Principles, the drafters considered whether 
to mainstream LGBTI issues already in place under current IHRL or to push for a new human rights 
instrument specifically tailored to the needs of LGBTI persons.211 Following the outcome of the 
“Brazilian Resolution”, the drafters decided that it was best to settle and seek recognition of a 
mainstreamed set of rights based on the existing rights contemplated in the IHRL system.212 With this 
decision, the Principles successfully accomplished some of their underlying purposes, they offered a 
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tool for LGBTI advocates, they offered a guide for governments about the compliance of human rights 
standards and they changed the language that was used at the time to refer to issues relevant to 
LGBTI people by adopting the terms SOGI and later SOGIESC.213 The fact that the Principles did not 
aspire for the creation of a new specialized instrument such as a declaration or a convention, 
facilitated their uptake by governments. This also offered governments an approach to these issues 
that was based on legal expertise unattached to any political or advocacy platform.214 However, it 
was precisely by making them too conformable to the considerations of the states that the 
effectiveness of the Principles was compromised, and that they became a normalizing tool rather than 
an emancipatory one.  
 
The first set of Principles demanded equal inclusion. In this sense, they ‘anchored themselves in the 
assumption that sexuality and gender is a universal characteristic of all people.’215 Similarly, they did 
little to recognize and draw attention to the different challenges experienced by different groups, such 
as the variations of the kinds of stigma and oppression that each of them face.216 As mentioned by 
Park, this emphasis on sameness is also found in the definitions provided for sexual orientation and 
gender identity, ‘the first Principles were drafted so as to create images of LGBTI people that would 
minimize deviations from prevailing heteronormative perspectives.’217 
The introduction to the Yogyakarta Principles defines sexual orientation as ‘each person’s capacity 
for profound emotional, affectional and sexual attraction to, and intimate and sexual relations with, 
individuals of a different gender or the same gender or more than one gender.’ This definition includes 
two important elements: sexual behavior and sexual attraction, which the Principles qualify by using 
terms that offer non-threatening and highly heteronormative understandings of sexual orientation as 
necessarily related to love and emotion.218 Sexual orientation in itself is an attribute that refers to the 
sexuality of a person, experiencing said sexuality does not necessarily entail the existence of 
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‘profound, emotional and affectional’ attraction. This way of framing sexual orientation only serves to 
portrait a sexuality that conforms to heteronormative conceptions of love and that strives for 
acceptability.219 
Something similar happens to the Principle’s conception of gender identity. The YP offer the following 
definition of gender identity: 
Gender identity is understood to refer to each person’s deeply felt internal and individual 
experience of gender, which may or may not correspond with the sex assigned at birth, 
including the personal sense of the body (which may involve, if freely chosen, modification of 
bodily appearance or function by medical, surgical or other means) and other expressions of 
gender, including dress, speech and mannerisms.220 
While the recognition of any bodily modification as something that must be freely chosen is an 
important step towards a transformative understanding of gender identity, the definition’s attempt to 
be inclusive falls short by insinuating that everyone has a gender identity.221 This framing of gender 
identity certainly excludes the experiences of persons who do not experience gender as an identity 
(e.g., agender, gender neutral, etc.)222 In addition to this, stating that gender identity is a ‘deeply felt 
internal experience’ responds to the normalizing need of IHRL to suggest that this is a inherent 
characteristic, both innate and unitary.223 This is again in stark contrast to the constructivist conception 
of gender and in turn supports a heteronormative notion that indicates that gender is stable and that 
therefore everyone can be categorized by it.224  
The definition of gender identity also recognizes two components of gender, one of identity (the 
awareness and acceptance of one’s gender) and one of expression (through dress, speech and 
mannerism). However, the way gender identity is expressed in the YP’s definition denotes a confusing 
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conjointment between the two, which implies that both identity and expression should correspond to 
each other.225 This is clearly not the case for people who, for a variety of reasons, are not allowed or 
choose not to express the gender that they identify with. Thus, understanding gender identity as such 
excludes people whose gender identity is not aligned with their gender expression. 
The supplement Principles (YP Plus 10), which instead of seeking equal inclusion strive for actual 
recognition of SOGIESC unique needs and differences, provided a solution for this dilemma. They 
presented a different definition for gender expression which recognized that these two components 
are not necessarily always aligned.226         
However, the YP Plus 10 did not expand the understanding of sexual orientation in the same way 
they did with gender expression and sex characteristics. The two important elements of sexual 
orientation as defined by the YP remained sexual behavior and sexual attraction. The definition 
overlooked completely the pivotal component of identity and it maintained the heteronormative 
conception of sexual orientation as linked to love and emotion.227  
To talk about identity is to talk about self-determination. While some people may identify as LGBTI, 
others may seek for more cultural-specific terms such as ‘metis’ (Nepali) or ‘hirja’ (Hindi). In this same 
way, people who engage in same-sex acts, and who do not necessarily experience any strong 
affections may identify as heterosexuals (some examples include exploratory sex, hook-up sex, 
transactional sex, etc.)228 
Not including identity in the way of understanding sexual orientation has the potential to impact 
negatively legal protections. Many people worldwide face discrimination and violence simply because 
identifying as LGBT for example. If sexual orientation is only based on the attributes of attraction and 
behavior, then such identification is not in itself an indication of a sexual orientation.229 In this sense 
‘an individual who was subjected to ill-treatment because of their identity would not receive human 
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rights protections tied to sexual orientation, because identity does not fall within the definition of 
sexual orientation.’230 
As an issue of human rights, simply manifesting one’s identity in regard to sexual orientation should 
be ‘explicitly protected under international human rights norms.’ Additionally, limiting the types of 
behaviors and affections that qualify as sexual orientation in order to conform them to a more 
normative and comfortable view of sexual orientation should be resisted. It is important to recognize 
that sexual behaviors and attractions do not necessarily need to be meaningful, they may be 
superficial for whatever reason and that should also be protected against any human rights abuse 
related to sex.231 
If states want to truly fulfill their promise not to leave anyone behind, these understandings should 
permeate the current state of international law, and to do that would mean that more substantial 
changes that touch on the structures underlying IHRL, need to be achieved, not only in terms of equal 
inclusion of SOGIESC concerns, but in terms of actual recognition of the different challenges faced 
by different people who experience sexual orientation, gender identity and sexual characteristics in 
diverse and non-normative ways.  
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AIMING TOWARDS A NEW INSTRUMENT 
 
The drafting process of the Yogyakarta Principles raised two important questions that changed the 
way in which the human rights of persons who deviate from the heteronorm are conceived: what are 
human rights for LGBTI+ persons? And should a new treaty addressing these rights be pursued?  
 
To answer the first question the drafters decided to draw exclusively from the already existing rights 
set out in IHRL.232 More specifically, their efforts focused on the application of the principles of 
universality and non-discrimination in regards to LGBTI+ persons,233 not minding that the human 
rights system was built entirely on androcentric and heteronormative concerns, and that it did not 
respond adequately to the different needs of each of the groups of persons who experience sexual 
orientation and/or gender identity/expression and/or sexual characteristics in diverse and non-
normative ways.  
 
Regarding the second question, the drafters agreed that pursuing a new treaty tailored to the life 
experiences of LGBTI+ persons would not be feasible given the lack of states’ support to previous 
attempts to include sexual orientation and gender identity in the IHRL agenda.234 Thus, the SOGIESC 
rights conceived by the YP, were anchored to the heteronormative paradigm of the human rights 
regime without even being part of a concrete system of human rights that would monitor and evaluate 
their implementation; and the future of a new treaty specialized in SOGIESC issues at the UN level 
became stalled.  
 
While the YP marked an important milestone for the expansion of the applicability of rights, to conform 
to this instrument, that sought mostly equality of inclusion, is to limit the emancipatory power that a 
treaty addressing SOGIESC rights would have. If such treaty was ever to be developed, it should 
recognize and challenge the fact that the human rights, universalized through international law, were 
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formulated to respond to the needs of certain types of humans that have predominantly been male 
and heterosexual and not of all humans who do not possess these and other characteristics.  
 
With this, I do not mean to say that IHRL must be rejected as a whole, or that the current rights 
recognized in it do not necessarily apply to people who deviate from the heteronorm. What I suggest 
is that even though these rights are important to all human beings, not all human beings have the 
same needs, desires and certainly they all do not face the same challenges. Therefore, not all human 
beings are able to have these basic rights fulfilled in the same way. And since these rights cannot be 
detached from a whole system that was based on heterosexual understandings of gender and 
sexuality, a new instrument addressing SOGIESC rights should also seek to challenge this 
heteronormativity, and its understandings of the needs, desires and challenges that people who 
experience sexual orientation and/or gender identity/expression and/or sexual characteristics in 
diverse and non-normative ways have.  
 
To illustrate the first part of this reasoning I will take the example of the right to marriage and family. 
This right is set out in Articles 16 of the UDHR and CEDAW, Article 23 of the ICCPR and Article 10 
of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR). The provisions on 
these instruments conceive the right to marriage and family as pertaining exclusively to people who 
identify and are perceived as heterosexual men and women. They also assume that this particular 
type of family is the natural and fundamental group unit of society and should therefore be entitled to 
protection by society and the States.  
 
The Yogyakarta Principles on its Principle 24 recognize the right to found a family regardless of sexual 
orientation or gender identity. However, despite their queer background, the YP threatens to embrace 
a heteronormative conception of family form, stepping away from social constructivism.235  While this 
instrument recognizes that families exist in diverse forms,236 the list of state obligations that it sets out 
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as necessary for the implementation of the right, merely reconfigures rather than challenge the 
heteronormative family model.237 It assumes, for example, that ‘the primary purpose of the family is 
to procreate, that the foundational family relationship is a monogamous couple and that the interests 
of children will be a primary concern.’238  
 
Moreover, the obligations do not contest enough the fact that governments have used marriage as a 
tool of social control to regulate sexuality and the formation of families by establishing a favored form 
that is rewarded, while stigmatizing and criminalizing other -queer- forms of  family, relationships, and 
sexual behaviors.239  
 
Such conception of what the right to marriage and family should be when applied to people who 
deviate from the heteronorm can ultimately force some of them to ‘normalize’ their behaviors in order 
to be able to access some benefits that should not be awarded through the heteronormative and 
coercive dynamic of marriage (e.g., immigration and health care).240 This is a clear evidence that 
simply striving for inclusion and equality is not enough to actually recognize and alleviate some of the 
inequities that people who experience sexual orientation and/or gender identity/expression and/or 
sexual characteristics in diverse and non-normative ways continue to endure.  
 
The idea that the right to marriage and to found a family should apply the same way indistinctly of 
sexual orientation or gender identity, and that such expansion of the applicability of rights comprises 
a fight for freedom and equality, has been considered absurd by some queer theorists and human 
rights activists.241 Spade and Willse, for example, express that the mere existence of legal marriage 
as a form of coercive regulation in which achieving or not marital status is linked to the access of vital 
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resources such as health care and paths to legalized migration is not equalizing nor freeing and 
should be resisted.242 
 
Marriage is undeniably part of a system where governments choose an idea of how relationships, 
families and sexual behaviors should be, and reward those who participate in it while punishing those 
who do not.243 One way in which this negatively impacts people is by making them engage in the 
dynamic of marriage and sometimes making them stay in abusive relationships because their 
immigration status depends on it.244 
 
Some people have also argued that the fight to expand the right to marriage and to found a family to 
cover same sex couples has contributed to improve popular opinion about LGBTI+ persons by 
portraying them in a role similar to the heteronormative model, that is as ‘members of families, 
parents, ordinary couples rather than through hyper-sexualized or pathologizing stereotypes.’245 
While this in itself is not an issue if people freely choose to fulfill such roles, to limit the protections 
and validation to only them and not to others who are not members of normative couples, fosters the 
stigmatization of people who engage in non-normative consented practices.246 
 
In previous chapters the point has been made that simply adding queer people to roles that have 
been traditionally exclusive of heterosexual persons (e.g., police forces, military, marriage)247 only 
installs the heterosexual matrix in a new way.248 Furthermore, it does not change the negative aspects 
of those roles or the institutions that rely on them. A comprehensive approach to these issues, that a 
treaty on SOGIESC rights should contemplate, should question why ‘marital status is tied to 
immigration and health care access, how queer and trans people are impacted by immigration 
imprisonment and deportation, and how homophobia and transphobia create negative health 
                                            
242 ibid 
243 ibid 
244 ibid 
245 ibid 
246 ibid 
247 ibid 
248 Butler, ‘Gender Trouble’ (n 6)  
 53 
outcomes and block health care access.’249 In other words, a treaty addressing SOGIESC issues 
should aim to deconstruct the normalizing effect of marriage and should seek to de-link marital status 
from essential benefits.250 
 
However, an instrument of this sort should not be taken lightly. Its development should involve the 
use of a more liberatory language that not only challenges the binary and heteronormative 
understandings of gender in IHRL, but that reflects the different, and also the most urgent, needs of 
persons who experience sexual orientation and/or gender identity/expression and/or sexual 
characteristics in diverse and non-normative ways. Its main purpose must be to condemn and 
eradicate violence based on the actual or perceived sexual orientation, gender identity/expression, 
or sexual characteristics of a person, while contesting the inequities that the heteronormative 
conceptions of IHRL has caused to people who deviate from them.  
 
In order to evaluate the feasibility behind the creation of a treaty that addresses SOGIESC rights, 
previous experiences on the drafting, implementation, and monitoring of similar instruments should 
be taken into consideration. In particular, the cases of the Yogyakarta Principles and the Convention 
on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW), as specialized instruments on gender 
and sexuality related issues in the international sphere, should serve as the basis of such evaluation. 
This exercise would allow for a better understanding of the challenges and critiques that a treaty on 
SOGIESC would face and need to overcome. It would provide as well an overview of how such 
instruments have positively impacted the lives of women and LGBTI+ persons. Other best practices 
and initiatives adopted by states and civil society in their own efforts to address SOGIESC rights 
should also be considered, especially those coming from the Global South.251 Having already 
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reviewed some of the shortcomings and positive outcomes of the YP, the following pages will briefly 
delve into the case of CEDAW.  
 
The Convention on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW) was adopted by the 
UN General Assembly in 1979.252 This treaty has been referred to as the ‘landmark treaty in the 
struggle for women’s rights’, and as the international ‘bill of rights for women.’253 The idea behind the 
creation of a binding instrument that addressed the rights of women came from the First World 
Conference on Women that was held in Mexico City in 1975. Until the treaty was adopted in 1979, 
there was no other significant document that comprehensively addressed the basic human rights of 
women in the  political, cultural, economic, social, and family spheres.254 Even before the adoption of 
the ICCPR and the ICESCR, women realized the shortcomings of general equality and non-
discrimination provisions and sought for an instrument that identified and condemned the multiple 
types of discrimination they faced all over the world.255 
 
The text of the Convention is comprised by a preamble and thirty provisions divided in six parts.256 
To date, 189 countries have ratified it.257  
 
The Convention provides a broader definition of discrimination compared to earlier treaties. It covers 
both equality of opportunity and equality of outcome.258 This instrument takes discrimination against 
women to be: 
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‘Any distinction, exclusion or restriction made on the basis of sex which has the effect or 
purpose of impairing or nullifying the recognition, enjoyment or exercise by women, 
irrespective of their marital status, on a basis of equality of men and women, of human rights 
and fundamental freedoms in the political, economic, social, cultural, civil or any other 
field.’259 
 
The Convention references a multiplicity of arenas where State Parties take legal and other measures 
to eliminate discrimination against women; these include: ‘the political and public life, international 
organizations, education, employment, healthcare, financial credit, cultural life, the rural sector and 
the law.’260 It also contemplates the use of temporary special measures to accelerate equality of 
outcome between men and women and aims at overcoming the dichotomy between the public and 
private divide commonly observed in international law.261  
 
Similarly to the reasoning I exposed in previous sections, CEDAW was born out of the idea that ‘one 
is less than human when one’s violation does not violate the human rights that are recognized.’262 In 
this sense, the Convention had the opportunity to become a transformative instrument that recognized 
women’s experiences of human rights violations. However, as a reflection of the limited 
understandings of gender and sex of the time in which the Convention was drafted, it failed to fully 
and explicitly recognize the gendered dimension of women’s experiences of abuse by anchoring its 
understanding of this issue to the biological determinism of the ‘sex’ category.263 
 
The Convention has been the subject of many criticism. Others, however, have praised its positive 
effects and have highlighted its influence on the change of states’ behavior towards women’s political 
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and social rights.264 I will briefly focus on three important critiques of this instrument that should be 
taken into account before a treaty on SOGIESC rights is considered.  
 
The first one is related to the shortcomings of the framing of CEDAW by only focusing on 
discrimination against women, leaving behind women’s experiences of violence and other abuses.  
 
Violence against women has been recognized as ‘the most pervasive yet least recognized human 
rights violation in the world.’265 However, because of the Convention’s focus on ‘public life, the 
economy, the legal system and education’,266 the male-centered view of equality offered in 
international law was reinforced, limiting the recognition of the oppression that women face in the 
private sphere as an issue of inequality. In this sense, CEDAW fails to explicitly prohibit violence 
against women, most likely due to the difficulty of ‘compressing a harm characterized as private into 
the public frame of the Convention, or perhaps because it does not fit into the equality model.’267 The 
Convention has nonetheless been interpreted as to prohibit violence against women as sex 
discrimination.268 General Recommendation No.19, which states that ‘gender-based violence is a 
form of discrimination that seriously inhibits women's ability to enjoy rights and freedoms on a basis 
of equality with men’, gives an account of this. However, given the non-binding nature of this type of 
recommendations, no state has yet proven capable to recognize such interpretation.269 The 
inefficiency of the Convention to capture the issue of violence against women shows that by granting 
women equality in gender-neutral terms, women’s needs are limited to what men need,270 and also 
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that ‘a special treatment approach is needed, as opposed to formal equality, to recognize that women 
exist in concrete contexts.’271  
The discrimination and violence suffered by both women and people who deviate from the heteronorm 
reveals their position as marginalized subjects of international human rights law.272 Many forms of 
violence directed against the latter are ‘based on the desire of the to “punish” those identities, 
expressions, behaviors or bodies that transgress traditional gender norms and roles, or that run 
contrary to the binary system of male/female.’273 However, although some jurisprudence has been 
developed and decisions have been made by international and regional human rights bodies in 
regards to discrimination based on sexual orientation and gender identity, a comprehensive definition 
of prejudiced-based violence regarding sexual orientation, gender identity, or bodily diversity is still 
lacking.274 Additionally, in the light of the current situation of LGBT rights in the world, where in 70 UN 
Member States consensual same-sex relationships and/or acts are still criminalized,275 and violence 
against LGBTI+ persons is sometimes encouraged, a treaty on SOGIESC should make of eradicating 
violence based on SOGIESC its main purpose.  
The second reason why CEDAW has been subjected to criticism has to do with its enforcement and 
implementation. Some authors argue that the ineffective implementation of provisions relating to 
women’s rights has ‘reduced the force of international legal regulation.276 According to Charlesworth 
and Chinkin, the implementation of CEDAW is affected by its weak language, the reservations 
entered by states parties to the convention and by the insufficient monitoring methods provided for 
the Convention itself.  
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It is true that the Convention is one of the most ratified yet most reserved UN treaties,277 and that its 
operative language is weaker than other treaties, such as the Race Convention.278 However, even 
though the situation for the enforcement mechanisms of CEDAW was comparatively weak at the 
outset, it has definitely improved in recent years, essentially mirroring the enforcement mechanisms 
of other human rights treaties,279 especially since the adoption of its Optional Protocol.280 
Nonetheless, the fact remains that the Women’s Convention had less enforcement power than its UN 
human rights treaty counterparts, and that despite its improvements, its enforcement mechanisms 
are still no stronger than those found in the rest of IHRL.281 
 
Regarding the reservations, there is no provision in the text of CEDAW that explicitly prohibits them 
as long as they do not go against the object and purpose of the Convention. This is problematic, 
however, to the extent that states are the ones who determine where a particular reservation is 
against the object and purpose of the Convention. States, who are the ones that enter obligations 
following the ratification of a treaty and the ones who can breach them, should not be placed in the 
position to decide whether a reservation to a treaty is or nor in line with the object and purpose of the 
document, such power and responsibility, some have argued, should be passed to the Human Rights 
Committee.282  
 
The third significant critique of CEDAW to take into account for the conception of a treaty on 
SOGIESC rights is related to its language and framing. In particular, with the way it has been said to 
reinforce the subordination of women and exclude -as most of IHRL- the experiences of people who 
experience sexual orientation and/or gender identity/expression and/or sexual characteristics in 
diverse and non-normative ways. Although a different language was necessary in CEDAW to address 
women’s rights due to the androcentric focus of IHRL in general -which tends to reproduce the male 
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norm masqueraded as neutral while systematically disadvantaging women-283 the framing of the 
Convention was insufficient because it only recognized men as the only other gender contemplated 
to compare and measure women’s equality and inequality.284 Such arrangement, paradoxically, 
‘whereby men’s experience sets the universal standard for everyone, reaffirms the tradition of both 
gender duality and hierarchy in an instrument that seeks to promote women’s full humanity.’285  
 
As it was previously mentioned, in spite of the fact that the genesis of IHRL in 1945 made it possible 
to contest the hierarchies of the binary gender categories, the understanding of both sex and gender 
as dualistic conceptions remained unquestioned.286 Furthermore, CEDAW, being the specialized 
instrument and Committee that addresses gender based discrimination has ultimately reinforced the 
gender binary approach of IHRL, turning invisible the experiences of sex and gender related 
discrimination and violence that some men, in particular gay men, trans persons, and other people 
who do not fit the dualistic conception of gender, experience.287 A broader and more comprehensive 
approach on this type of discrimination, that is undoubtedly rooted in the patriarchal system of beliefs 
and its heteronormativity, could have contributed to attenuate the adverse effects that the treatment 
of the gender binary -which always works asymmetrically to women’s disadvantage- had.288  
 
As a result of this inadequate and dualistic way of framing the Convention, ‘protective responses to 
women’s disadvantage have continued to proliferate where women’s experience is not directly 
comparable with men’s, with extra intensity in relation to women from the Global South.’289 This is 
especially notable in the fields of reproductive health and employment.290 Additionally, the binarism 
of CEDAW’s framework, which is founded on the biological determinism of the ‘sex’ category, does 
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not specify whether or not a transwoman would qualify as a ‘‘woman’ who can therefore be a victim 
of ‘sex’ discrimination.’291   
 
In the same way that CEDAW was created to place women’s rights within the male-centered system 
that is IHRL, a more substantial approach to SOGIESC rights in the human rights paradigm is not 
only needed but long overdue. A Convention on SOGIESC rights would not be the only solution for 
the abuses that persons who experience sexual orientation and/or gender identity/expression and/or 
sexual characteristics in diverse and non-normative ways face, but it is definitely a way forward.  
 
Considering the experiences of the YP and the CEDAW Convention, said treaty would need to 
expand its conceptions of gender and sexuality to finally break from the restrictive notions of these 
categories that have been set by the heteronorm in IHRL. In addition to this, issues of sexual 
characteristics must also be included to compensate for decades and decades of exclusion. Gender 
identity should also be contemplated as a broader identity mark; one that not only pertains to trans 
people but to everyone who decides to define their identities in terms of gender categories. However, 
the different challenges and abuses that trans persons and others whose gender identities deviate 
from the heteronorm should undoubtedly be taken into account with urgent attention. At the same, 
the experiences of people whose identities challenge any category of gender (e.g. non-binary 
persons, agenders, etc.) must also be considered and codified as IHRL concerns. 
CONCLUSION 
 
The international human rights system was originally conceived to protect everyone, everywhere and 
under any circumstances.292 However, this purported universality in which IHRL was founded has 
proven to be purely aspirational rather than a fact.293 This system imposed a strict classification of 
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what it means to be human, one that has been, and continues to be, enrooted in heteronormative 
conceptions of sexuality, gender, and sexual characteristics. From its genesis, the human rights 
paradigm installed a biological determinism in IHRL that has remained almost untouched, excluding 
from its ‘universal’ embrace people who experience sexual orientation and/or gender identities, and/or 
sexual characteristics in diverse and non-normative ways.  
 
Some developments in the international arena have tried to include issues of sexual orientation and 
gender identity into their scope, some others have even been developed exclusively to cover 
SOGIESC concerns. While these efforts for the expansion of the applicability of rights are valuable 
and have, to some extent, been beneficial; they are still inconsistent and anchored to binary or 
biological conceptions of sex and gender; and, in most cases, they continue to reproduce the 
heterosexual matrix in new ways. The normalizing effect that said developments have in the lives of 
people who deviate from the heteronorm must be resisted. Instead, IHRL must seek to recognize and 
protect the different experiences of identity, sexuality, physical integrity and bodily autonomy of 
everyone, especially the ones from those who have been historically marginalized. In this sense, 
IHRL could benefit from the emancipatory effect that queer theories have to offer, which aims at 
challenging all that is dominant and normative and at dismantling all the sexual and gender 
hierarchies.294 Maybe once this is accomplished, the human rights paradigm can acknowledge that 
the relationships between bodies and identities are dynamic and can give rise to multiple possible 
alignments that can change over time;295 and that is not possible to actually achieve freedom from 
oppression until wider questions of sexual freedom are addressed and the general patterns of 
dominance and subordination that form part of IHRL are challenged and changed.296 
 
It is clear that the heteronormativity of the human rights system must be challenged, but until that can 
actually be resolved, the responsibility remains to include the experiences of all human beings in the 
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human rights regime. Principally, taking into account the different and urgent types of human rights 
abuses that people who experience sexual orientation and/or gender identities, and/or sexual 
characteristics in diverse and non-normative ways continue to face all over the world. In this regard, 
a new treaty on SOGIESC may be one salient way to portray such abuses as human rights issues, 
thus providing opportunities for people who have experienced violations to find support in the 
international sphere.297 Moreover, said treaty could be instrumental to start filling the gaps that the 
absence of a broader and more liberatory understanding of gender in IHRL has caused, and it can 
also be an important tool to guarantee consistency in the regional and international approaches to 
SOGIESC issues.  
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